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NOTES
LEAD-BASED PAINT LITIGATION AND
THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION:
TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF
MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
In 1987, attorneys for Monica Santiago filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking damages
from several manufacturers of the lead pigment used in lead-based
paint, charging that their negligence caused her to suffer lead poison-
ing.' At the heart of Santiago's claim was the argument that the court
should adopt a theory of market share liability and hold each defen-
dant liable for damages proportional to its share of the lead pigment
market.' In 1991, the City of Philadelphia brought an even more
sweeping suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania seeking damages to cover the entire expense of remov-
ing lead-based paint from city buildings and for creating programs to
screen and treat the public for lead poisoning." Like Santiago, the City
asked the court to adopt a theory of market share liability.`' Despite the
predictions of some attorneys that injuries from lead paint poisoning
would be the next mass tort, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the First and Third Circuits recently issued decisions in these cases in
which they refused to endorse a market share theory of liability.'
Although these decisions do not foreclose the possibility of future
courts' holding the lead paint industry liable under a market share
I Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Stipp. 186, 188 (I). Mass. 1992), affd, 3 F.3d 546
(1st Cir. 1 993).
2 See id.
3
 City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 90-7064, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5849, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 23, 1992), affd, 994 E2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993).
4 Id.
5
 City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. A.ss'n, 994 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1993); Santiago v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 551 (1st Cir. 1993); Julie C. Shoop, Class Actions Add Momentum to Lead
Paint Litigation, TRIAL, Apr. 1992, at II, 11.
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theory, they appear to indicate that courts are going to be very cautious
about expanding mass tort theories. 6
The doctrine of market share liability has encountered significant
resistance from most courts throughout its short history.' The Califor-
nia Supreme Court first adopted the theory as a means of holding
manufacturers of diethystilbestrol ("DES") liable for injuries caused to
plaintiffs whose mothers had taken the drug during pregnancy to
prevent morning sickness and miscarriages. 8 Even so, DES plaintiffs
have been only moderately successful in winning acceptance of market
share liability in other courts. 9 Furthermore, attempts to use market
share liability theories outside the DES context have had almost no
success.'° The most notable failures have occurred in litigation over
injuries caused by asbestos and defective vaccines."
This Note analyzes the Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co. and City
of Philadelphia v. Lead Industries Ass'n decisions in light of the history
of market share liability litigation and argues for a unified theory of
market share liability based on underlying theories of tort law. Section
I explores the medical effects and primary sources of lead poisoning
and the difficulties associated with diagnosis and treatment.' 2 Section
II reviews the history of the market share theory of liability, focusing
primarily on the different versions that have been developed by various
courts.' 3
 Section III sets out the district court and Third Circuit opin-
ions in the City of Philadelphia case. 14 Section IV reviews the opinions
of the district court and First Circuit in the Santiago case. 16 Finally,
Section V analyzes the two competing theories underlying causation in
tort law and argues for a theory of market share liability consistent with
both.' 6
6 See Joseph J. Ortega & Josh H. Kardisch, Lead Paint Cases Raise Causation Issues, NAT'L.
Lj., Nov. 8,1993, at 19,21.
7
 Andrew B. Nace, Comment, Market Share Liability: A Curren/ Assessment of a Decade-Old
Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395,418 (1991).
See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924,937-38 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
2 See David A. Fischer, Products Liability—An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 1623,1647 (1981); Nace, supra note 7, at 418.
1 ° Nace, supra note 7, at 414-18.
" Id.
12 See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 37-84 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 85-127 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 128-78 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 179-228 and accompanying text.
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1. THE MEDICAL EFFECTS OF LEAD POISONING
Despite passage of numerous laws designed to reduce environ-
mental lead levels, many sources for lead exposure persist in the
United States. 17
 The most significant sources of lead poisoning today
result from lead deposited prior to the passage of anti-lead statutes.'s
Lead is indestructible in the environment, and thus much of our
current problem results from the fact that lead was once a common
ingredient in paints, gasoline and solders.'' The principal sources for
lead exposure today include lead-based paint in the form of paint chips
and dust, drinking water tainted by lead in plumbing and distribution
systems, and soil contamination due mostly to motor vehicle exhaust
and lead paint dust. 2" Of these sources, lead-based paint is the most
significant source of lead exposure, particularly among children. 2 !
Infants and young children are considered most vulnerable to
lead and its adverse health effects. 22 Young children are more likely to
ingest lead and, because their bodies are growing rapidly, they absorb
and retain more lead than adults. 23
 In addition, children suffer adverse
health effects at lower blood lead levels than adults. 24 A child can
become severely lead poisoned by ingesting a mere one milligram of
17
 See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEAI:EH AND
HUMAN SERVS., THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED
STATES: A REPotrr To CoNGRzss 8-9 (1988) [hereinafter ATSDR REeoRT]; Martha R. Mahoney,
Four Million Children at Risk: Lead Paint Poisoning Victims and the Law, 9 STAN. Etvvrt.. L.J. 46,
47,61-70 (1990). Anti-lead laws include, most notably, the regulation of lead in gasoline and laws
requiring abatement of lead paint in apartment buildings. Mahoney, supra at 61-70.
18
 Lead Poisoning: Hearings on Hit 2840 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1991) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Linda]. Fisher, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances,
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency).
1 " Id,
20 ATSDR Itto•oirr, supra note 17, at 8-9; Hearings, supra note 18, at 52. Other less significant
sources of lead include food, smelters, gasoline, secondary exposure to lead transported home
from work, lead-glazed pottery and certain folk medicines, ATSDR RiteoRT, supra note 17, at 8-9.
21 Hearings, supra note 18, at 61. For a good review of the history of lead-based paint
production, see Michelle Gilligan & Deborah Ann Ford, Investor Response to Lead
-Based Paint
Abatement Laws: Legal and Economic Considerations, 12 COLUM. J. ENYTI.. L. 245,246-51 (1987).
22 ATSDR REPORT, supra note 17, at 9. The developing fetus is also at risk for lead exposure,
as lead is readily transferred across the placenta. Id.
23 ATSDR REPORT, supra note 17, at 111-9; Gilligan & Ford, supra note 21, at 253-54. Toddlers
have a tendency to eat paint chips and other nonfood items (referred to as pica) as part of the
normal hand-to-mouth exploration phase of development. ATSDR REPORT, supra note 17, at 11-7;
Gilligan & Ford, supra note 21, at 253 n.66. Children excrete less lead than adults because their
still-developing hones absorb greater quantities of lead. ATSDR REPORT, supra note 17, at 111-8.
24 Gilligan & Ford, supra note 21, at 254.
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lead paint dust—as much as three granules of sugar—each day. 28 Fi-
nally, lead poisoning is difficult to diagnose at early stages because
there are no obvious or unusual symptoms.26
Approximately three to four million children in the United States
have toxic levels of lead in their blood. 27 Severe lead poisoning usually
results in convulsions, coma, irreversible mental retardation, seizures
and even death.28 At lower blood lead levels, where there are few if any
clinical symptoms, children suffer from reduced IQ, impaired hearing,
attention disorders, behavioral disturbances and learning disabilities. 29
Most of these injuries are the result of damage done to the central
nervous system." Although studies have yet to produce firm conclu-
sions, they do indicate that these effects are persistent and long-term,
if not permanent."
Due to the generic nature of the effects of lead poisoning, it can
be difficult to show both that lead poisoning is the cause of specific
health defects and that a specific case of lead poisoning is clue to lead
paint." When a child has been diagnosed with lead poisoning, testi-
mony of parents, friends or relatives who have seen the child chewing
on surfaces coated with lead paint or putting paint chips in his or her
mouth can be used to prove that lead paint was the cause of the
poisoning." Also, scientific analyses can be used to match lead found
in a child's primary teeth or blood to the lead from a paint sample."
Showing that effects such as attention disorders and learning disabili-
ties are the result of lead poisoning is more difficult." The best evi-
dence available is the testimony of a physician with expertise in treating
childhood lead poisoning and the evaluation of a neuropsychologist."
25 Steven Waldman, Lead and Your Kids, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1991, at 42, 46.
26 Gilligan & Ford, supra note 21, at 254. Early symptoms include irritability, clumsiness,
Fatigue, headaches and vomiting. Id.
27 ATSDR Ria,otcy , supra note 17, at 1-47. Currently, blood lead levels of over 15 tig/c11 are
believed to cause adverse health effects. Id.
28 Id. at 10.
19 Id. at 10; Herbert L. Needleman et al., The Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Low Doses of
Lead in Childhood, 322 Ns:w ENG. J. MED. 142, 147 (1990).
"ATSDR REPORT, supra note 17, at IV-23; see Needleman, supra note 29, at 142.
31 ATSDR REPORT, supra note 17, at 1V-23.
32 See Benjamin Hiller & Jeffrey M. Feuer, Expert Testimony  in Childhood Lead-Poisoning Cases,
TRIAL, Mar. 1991, at 46, 47-49.
33 Id. at 47.
34 Id.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
The few courts adopting market share liability agree on three basic
requirements. First, plaintiffs must show that a particular product man-
ufactured by all of the defendants named in the lawsuit caused their
injuries." Second, they must prove that a design defect in the product
caused the harm and that each defendant sold the product in a man-
ner that made it unreasonably dangerous.'s Finally, the plaintiffs must
be unable to identify the specific manufacturer of the product that
caused their injury." Beyond these initial requirements, however, the
courts that have adopted market share liability disagree about how to
apply the doctrine.'"
The California Supreme Court developed the market share theory
of liability in 1980 in the case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. 4 ' The
Sindell court held that the manufacturers of DES would be liable for
the plaintiff's injuries upon a showing that the manufacturers pro-
duced a substantial share of the drug. 42
 Each manufacturer would be
held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share
of the DES market, unless it could show it did not make the product
that caused the plaintiff's injuries.43 In Sindell, the plaintiffs" brought
suit against eleven drug companies that manufactured, promoted and
marketed DES between the years 1941 and 1971. 45
 The named plaintiff,
Judith Sindell ("Sindell"), alleged that, as a result of her mother's
ingestion of DES, she had developed a malignant bladder tumor which
had to be surgically removed.'" The plaintiff was not able to identify
37
	 Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
Hymowitz. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072, 1075 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989);
Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984) (en bane).
38 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936; Hymowitz., 539 N.E.2d at 1072, 1075; Martin, 689 P.2d at 382.
" Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936; Ilymareitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1072, 1075; Martin, 689 P.2d at 382.
40 See City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1993). The Third
Circuit noted that the various courts that have applied market share liability could not agree on
how to calculate the market share of the defendants and which party should have the burden of
proving the actual market share of each defendant. Id.
43 607 P.2d at 937-38.
42 Id. at 936-37.
43 Id. at 937.
44 The action in Sindell was brought by a class of plaintiffs consisting of "'girls and women
who are residents of California and who have been exposed to DES before birth and who may
or may not know that fact or the dangers' to which they were exposed." Id. at 925 n.1 (quoting
complaint).
45 Id. at 925.
46 Sindell, 607 P.2d at. 926. DES can cause cancerous vaginal and cervical growths, known as
adencarcinoma, in women exposed to the drug before birth. Id. at 925. DES also causes pre-
cancerous vaginal and cervical growths, known as adenosis, that may spread to other areas of the
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which of the defendant manufacturers, if any, actually produced the
DES taken by her mother. 47
 This predicament was common in DES
cases because all manufacturers of DES produced the drug from the
same chemical formula and used generic labeling." These practices
prevented Sindell from identifying the particular manufacturer re-
sponsible for her injuries." Therefore, the plaintiff argued for joint
and several liability of all defendants under three separate collective
share liability theories, all of which were rejected by the Sindell court."
Having rejected traditional collective share remedies, the Sindell
court seized on the invitation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to
modify existing theories of collective share liability in response to
special circumstances. 5 ' The California Supreme Court, drawing on
an idea proposed in a student-authored Fordham Law Review note,
adopted the theory of market share liability." The court did not re-
quire the plaintiff to prove that one of the defendants definitely caused
her injury." Rather, it stated that the plaintiff could recover because
she had joined as defendants in the action a substantial percentage
body and must therefore be surgically removed. Id. Women who have any of these conditions
must undergo painful and expensive biopsies or colposcopic examinations twice a year as a
preventive measure. Id,
47 Id. at 926.
48
 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368, 374 (Wash. 1984) (en bane). These manufacturing
and marketing practices were carried out at the request of the FDA and made possible, in part,
because the chemical formula for DES was never patented. Martin, 689 P.2d at 373-74. Identifica-
tion of the responsible defendants was further complicated by the fact that doctors often pre-
scribed the drug by its generic name and pharmacists filled prescriptions with whatever brand of
the drug they had in stock. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926.
49 See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926.
5° See id. at 926, 936. Sindell first sought recovery under the theory of alternate liability
developed by the California Supreme Court in Summers v. Tice. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 928 (citing
199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)). The Sindell court refused to apply this theory for two reasons. Sindell
607 P.2d at 930, 931. First, the DES manufacturers were in no better position than the plaintiff
to identify the producer of the DES taken by plaintiff's mother. Id. at 930. Second, having more
than 200 possibly culpable defendants made it impossible to know whether any of the defendants
before the court actually caused plaintiff's injury. Id. at 931. Sindell also relied on the concert of
action theory in seeking recovery. Id. The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the
defendants had no tacit understanding or common plan to fail either to conduct adequate tests
or to give sufficient warnings. Id. at 932. The final principle relied on by Sindell was that of
enterprise liability. Id. at 933. The court rejected this theory because of the large number of DES
manufacturers, the absence of a common trade association and the close regulation of the drug
industry by the FDA. Id. at 935.
51
 See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmts. g, h
(1965)).
5'2 See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937 (citing Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory
of Enterprise Liability, 46 FoitintAm L. REv. 963 (1978)).
53 See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
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of the manufacturers shown to have produced DES at the time her
mother purchased the DES that caused the plaintiff's injury. 54
 The
court then shifted the burden to the defendant manufacturers to prove
that they had not produced the DES that injured the plaintiff. i 5 Those
manufacturers unable to meet this burden would be held liable for the
amount of the plaintiff's damages proportional to their share of the
DES market at the time the plaintiff's mother used DES. 56
The Sindell court decided not to adhere to a rigid view of causation
in order to give effect to the policies underlying tort law, 57
 The court
announced that it was persuaded by the principle announced in a prior
joint liability case: "as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent
defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury."58 Turning its
attention to the policies underlying tort law, the court stated that the
defendants should be held liable because they were in a better position
to bear the costs of the injury resulting from the manufacture of a
defective product." Additionally, the court noted that holding the
manufacturers liable would provide an incentive for them to produce
safer products." Finally, the court emphasized that these policy consid-
erations were especially significant where medication is involved be-
cause consumers are virtually helpless to protect themselves from inju-
ries caused by defective drugs.'''
In 1984, the Washington Supreme Court in Martin v, Abbott Labo-
ratories rejected the Sindell court's formulation of market share liability
and developed its own version known as "market share alternate liabil-
ity. "6 2 Under the Martin court's theory, the plaintiff need only sue a
single DES manufacturer, but that manufacturer cannot be held liable
for more than its proven market share.° The Martin court refused to
54 Id. The Ford ham Law Review comment suggested that the plaintiff should be required to
join 75% to 80% of the manufacturers in the market in order to create "clear and convincing
evidence" that one of the defendants manufactured the product which caused the plaintiffs
injury. Sheiner, supra note 52, at 996.
55 Shidell, 607 P.2d at 937.
56 1d. The Sindett decision has been criticized for failing to specify what percentage of the
product market should be considered substantial, for not determining whether national or
regional markets should he used in calculating market share, and for not stating which party has
the burden of establishing a defendant's market share. See Kurt M. Zitzer & Marc D. Ginsberg,
Illinois Rejects Market Share Lialnlity: A Polity Based Analysis of Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 KY. L.J.
617, 621-22 (1990-91).
57 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
58 .M. (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)).
53 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984) (en bane).
63
 Id. at 382, 383.
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adopt the Sindell market share theory of liability on two grounds. 64
First, the court stated that the Sindell court failed to explain what
constitutes a "substantial" share of the relevant market.° Second, it was
troubled because, under the Sindell theory, less than 100% of the
market would be required to bear 100% of the cost of plaintiffs
injuries.66
The Martin court stated that the plaintiff must allege four ele-
ments. 67 First, that her mother took DES." Second, that her injuries
were caused by the DES." Third, that the defendant produced the
"type" of DES taken by the plaintiffs mother. 7° Finally, that manufac-
turing or producing the DES constituted a breach of the defendant's
duty of care:n The court explained that defendants could exculpate
themselves from liability by establishing that they did not produce or
market the type of DES taken by the plaintiffs mother. 72
 Alternatively,
defendants could exculpate themselves by showing that they did not
market DES within the geographic area where plaintiffs mother ob-
tained DES or during the time period when plaintiff s mother pur-
chased the drug."
Those defendants unable to exculpate themselves from potential
liability are presumed to have equal shares of the plaintiffs DES mar-
ket, adjusted to total 100% of the market. 74
 Defendants are entitled to
rebut this presumption and reduce their potential liability by estab-
lishing their actual market share within the geographic area." The
Martin court went on to point out that where all defendants are able
to prove their actual market share, and the resulting total is less than
100%, the plaintiff will recover less than 100% of awarded damages."




 Martin, 689 P.2d at 382.
°L° Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. The court noted that evidence of dosage, color, shape, markings, size or other iden-
tifiable characteristics could be used to show that a manufacturer produced the same type of DES
used by the plaintiff's mother. Id.
71 Id.
72
 Martin, 689 P.2d at 382.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 383.
75 id.
76 Id. The court illustrated the application of this rule with the following three hypotheticals:
Assume that plaintiff's damages are $100,000 and defendants X and Y remain
subject to liability after exculpation by other named defendants. If neither estab-
lishes its market share then they are presumed to have equal shares of the market
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The New York Court of Appeals announced a third version of
market share liability in 1989 in the case of Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co."
The Hymowitz court decided that a defendant's share of potential
damages ought to be determined based on its share of the national
market." The court reasoned that use of a national market would be
the most fair method because it apportions defendants' liabilities ac-
cording to their total culpability in marketing DES to the public at
large." As with most other successful market share suits, the plaintiffs
in Hymowitz were women seeking damages for injuries caused by their
mothers' ingestion of DES during pregnancy. 8" As a result of using the
national market to determine a defendant's share of the damages, a
defendant could not exculpate itself by showing that it had not mar-
keted DES at the time of the plaintiff's injury or in the geographical
area where the plaintiff's mother lived. 81 Additionally, the Hymowitz
court stated that it would not allow a defendant to exculpate itself from
liability by showing that it had not produced or marketed the particular
type of DES that caused the plaintiff's injury. 82 The court reasoned that
the culpability of a manufacturer of DES is not lessened because it
happened to market a more identifiable pill or sold only to certain
drugstores." The Hymowitz court also stated that the liability of DES
producers is several only, and thus the liability of the defendant manu-
facturers should not be adjusted to total 100% where all DES manu-
facturers have not been named as defendants.84
and are liable respectively for 50 percent of the total judgment, X, $50,000 and Y,
$50,000.
Assume defendant X establishes that it occupies 20 percent of the relevant market,
and defendant Y fails to prove its market share. Defendant X is then liable for 20
percent of the damages, or $20,000, and defendant Y is subject to the remaining
80 percent, or $80,000.
Assume that defendant X establishes a market share of 20 percent and defendant
Y a 60 percent market share. Then defendant X is subject to 20 percent of the
judgment, $20,000, and defendant Y to 60 percent of the judgment, $60,000. The
plaintiff does not recover her entire judgment because the remaining 20 percent
of the market share is the responsibility of unnamed defendants.
Id.




 Id. at 943. Plaintiffs did not bring a class action; rather, the cases decided by the court were
representative of nearly 500 similar actions pending in New York state courts. Id,
Hi Id. at 950.
82 See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078.
83 Id.
" Id.
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III. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA V. LEAD INDUSTRIES Ass 'N
On May 11, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in City of Philadelphia v. Lead Industries Ass 'n, held that Penn-
sylvania law would not permit recovery against the lead-based paint
industry under a theory of market share liability." The plaintiffs in the
case, the City of Philadelphia (the "City") and the Philadelphia Hous-
ing Authority ("PHA"), sued several manufacturers of lead pigment
and their trade association to recover the costs of abating hazardous
lead-based paint from city buildings. 86
 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the plaintiffs could
not proceed under a theory of market share liability because the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had neither adopted that theory nor sent
any authoritative signal that it would do so. 87
 In reaching its decision,
the Third Circuit reasoned that, as a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction, it could not significantly expand state law without clear
indication that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reach the same
result. 88
 The court emphasized that caution was especially important
because there was no single widely accepted version of the market
share doctrine."
The City of Philadelphia plaintiffs brought suit against the defen-
dants in response to new regulations promulgated by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") that be-
came effective in the spring of 1990. 9° These regulations required the
City and PHA to warn residents of HUD-associated housing built prior
to 1978 about the dangers of lead paint and to remove all lead-based
paint from these housing units. 91
 The City and PHA" brought suit
85 994 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1993).
86 Id. at 115-16.
87 Id. at 115.
88 Id.
86 Id. at 127.
`x'24 C.F.R. § 35.1 (1995), The new regulations were issued pursuant to the Lead-Based
Poisoning Prevention Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 4821-46 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
81
 City of Phila., 994 F.2d at 115 (citing 24 C.F.R. §§ 35.5(a), 35.24(b) (1992)). HUD provides
no funding to cities to help them comply with the regulations. Id.
82
 The plaintiffs also brought a class action on behalf of
The City of Philadelphia and all other cities in the United States with a population
over 100,000 persons, the Philadelphia Housing Authority, and all housing authori-
ties and/or public health authorities affiliated with such cities (collectively the
"Cities" or "Class") engaged in and/or contemplating a program:
a. for the inspection, testing, monitoring or abatement of lead paint in properties
within the respective jurisdictions of the Cities, which have been built or whose
interiors have been painted within the period from the early 1900s through 1977,
which are owned and/or managed by the Cities, and/or privately owned or man-
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against several manufacturers of lead pigment and the Lead Industries
Association ("LIA") in order to shift the costs of complying with the
HUD regulations to those they viewed as being primarily responsible
for this public health threat."
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendant manufactur-
ers and trade association had known since the early 1900s that lead
paint was extremely hazardous." In addition, the plaintiff's asserted
that despite the availability of nontoxic substitute pigments, the defen-
dants continued to encourage the use of lead pigments in paint in-
tended for interior residential use." The plaintiffs alleged that the LIA,
of which all of the defendants were members at some point, misrepre-
sented the health effects of lead paint to the public and attempted to
discredit studies that documented the toxicity of lead pigment." In
addition, they argued that the LIA carried out a vigorous lobbying
effort to mislead state and federal legislative bodies considering restric-
tions on the use of lead paint.° In response to the plaintiffs' suit,
defendant manufacturers and the LIA filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that market share liability was not a viable theory for recovery
under Pennsylvania law."
A. The District Court Opinion Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint
In its 1992 opinion granting defendant's motion to dismiss, the
district court held that Pennsylvania law did not recognize a market
share theory of liability." In a brief two paragraph analysis, the court
aged where a known lead paint hazard exists and private owners refuse to abate
such hazard; and/or
b. to screen, test, diagnose and treat the residents of the Cities for exposure to
lead paint and to educate them about its hazards.
City of Phila., 994 F.2d at 115 n.l.
93 Id. at 115-16. Plaintiffs sought $100,000,000 in damages from NL Industries, Inc., Atlantic
Richfield Co., Sherwin-Williams Co., Glidden Co. and Fuller-O'Brien Corp. Id. at 115 11.1.
94 Id. at 116. Plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted claims for negligent product design,
strict product liability, negligent failure to warn, breach of warranty, fraud and misrepresentation,
indemnification, restitution and punitive damages. Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 City of Phila., 994 F.2d at 116.
58 1d. at 117.
99
 City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 90-7064, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5849, at *49 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 23, 1992), affd, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993). In a separate decision, the court held that
the statute of limitations barred the City's claims but not those of the PHA because, as an agency
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the PHA was protected by the doctrine of indium tempos,
City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 90-7064, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3720, at *25- 4'26 (E•D.
Pa. Feb. 3, 1992), affd, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993), The district court dismissed plaintiffs'
negligent product design and strict product liability claims because there was no evidence that
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stated that Pennsylvania courts would reject market share liability be-
cause the theory abandons the requirement of proximate causation.m
The court explained that Pennsylvania courts had consistently rejected
similar collective action theories on the grounds that they violated the
proximate cause requirement. 1 °' The court described market share
liability as a novel theory and, citing its role as a federal court sitting
in diversity jurisdiction, the court refused to expand state tort law.'N
B. The Third Circuit's Opinion
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's order and held that Pennsylvania law would not
allow recovery under the theory of market share liability.m In reaching
its holding, the court emphasized the limits on its authority to expand
state common law. 104 The Third Circuit reasoned that it could not relax
the proximate causation requirement without a clear authoritative
signal of approval from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 1 °5 The Third
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that market share
liability was a controversial and radical theory that had never been
endorsed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.'° 6
Before evaluating plaintiffs' market share claim, the Third Circuit
presented an extensive review of the constraints on its authority as a
federal court presiding over a diversity case.m 7 The court stated that
lead pigment could be made safer, only that it should not have been used at all. City of Phila.,
No. 90-7064,1992 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 5849, at *7—'09, *11—*12, Plaintiffs' breach of warranties claim
was dismissed because the challenged conduct was the misleading sale of lead-based paint where
the defendants only produced lead pigment, an ingredient in lead paint. Id. at *12—*14. Plaintiffs'
claim for fraud and misrepresentation was dismissed because plaintiffs failed to show justified
reliance by the public on the alleged misrepresentations by the defendants. Id. at *14—*21. The
court dismissed the claim for indemnification on the grounds that a statutory obligation did not
equal a judgment of liability and therefore there was no damages award for the defendants to
reimburse. Id. at *34—*36. The court dismissed the restitution and failure-to-warn claims because
plaintiffs conceded they could not show proximate causation. Id. at *9—*10, *21—*23. Finally, the
court dismissed all plaintiffs' joint and several liability claims including those of civil conspiracy,
concert of action, enterprise liability, market share liability and alternative liability. Id. at *36—*59.
1 °11 City of Phila., No. 90-7064,1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5849, at *49,
101 Id.
102 Id. at *45—*46, *49—*50.
103 City of Phila., 994 F.2d at 115. The Third Circuit upheld the district court's holding that
the City, but not the PHA, was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 114. Plaintiffs appealed
the district court's decision only on three theories of collective liability: alternative liability, market
share liability and enterprise liability. Id. at 114-15. The Third Circuit upheld the district court's
order dismissing these claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to establish the causation
element of each of these causes of action. Id. at 115.
1 °4 Id. at 122-23.
1 °5 See id. at 126.
196 1d. at 127,
1 °7 1d. at 122-23.
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although federal courts may act as judicial pioneers when interpreting
the United States Constitution or federal law, they are not free to
engage in judicial activism in diversity cases. 1 °8
 According to the court,
federalism concerns require federal courts to simply apply state law as
they infer it to be at the present time, not according to what they think
it might develop to be.'"u
The City of Philadelphia court then turned its full attention to the
market share theory of liability."° Looking first to state common law,
the Third Circuit noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
never decided or even considered the issue of market share liability."'
A review of lower court decisions turned up a single trial court decision
allowing a DES plaintiff to proceed under a market share theory." 2 The
Third Circuit also examined discussions of market share liability in
three state superior court cases that, according to the plaintiffs, indi-
cated acceptance of the doctrine." 3
 The Third Circuit, however, deter-
mined that these courts did not actually apply the theory and never
stated whether it should be adopted in Pennsylvania. 14
The Third Circuit continued its analysis of market share liability
by reviewing the policy arguments for and against acceptance of the
doctrine. 115
 The court reasoned that market share liability did further
one primary objective of tort law by compensating innocent victims." 5
In addition, the court noted that market share liability is effective in
distributing the high cost of injuries from defective products."'' Rather
than placing the whole financial burden on individual victims, it allows
companies to spread the cost of the injuries among consumers as a
cost of doing business." 8
The court noted, however, that there were many policy argu-
ments against adoption of market share liability. " 9
 It stated that market
share liability would be unfair to many defendants who would be forced
to pay high litigation costs to defend themselves against claims in-
I" City of Phila., 994 F.2d al 1'23.
166 /d.
no Id.
ill Id. at 124.
"2 1d. (citing Erlich v. Abbott Lab., 5 Phila. 249 (C.P. 1981)). The Erlich court applied the
version of market share liability developed by the California Supreme Court in Sindell. Id.
119
 City of Phila., 994 F.2d at 125 (citing Pennlield Corp. v. Meadow Valley Elec., Inc., 604
A.2d 1082, 1087 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Burnside v. Abbott Lab., 505 A.2d 973, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985); Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d 963, 971-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)).
114 City of Phila., 944 12.2c1 at 125.




119 City of Phila., 994 E2d at 126.
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volving their products irrespective of the size of their market share.' 2°
In addition, the court noted that some experts believe that market
share liability would inhibit new research and development, especially
among pharmaceutical companies. 12 ' Finally, the court questioned the
ability of the judicial system to manage broad market share liability
actions.' 22
In concluding its analysis of market share liability, the Third Cir-
cuit noted that there is no single accepted version of the theory. 12" The
City of Philadelphia court reasoned that even if it were to find that
Pennsylvania would adopt market share liability, it would wait for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to do so explicitly.' 24 The many different
models of market share liability from which it could choose, in addition
to the lack of a clear signal from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
regarding how it would balance the competing policy concerns, con-
vinced the Third Circuit that as a federal court in a diversity case, it
should leave it to the state courts to adopt the theory.' 26 The court
rejected plaintiffs' contention that market share liability would not be
a radical departure from traditional tort law principles.' 26 Thus, hold-
ing market share liability to be a novel and unsettled doctrine, the
Third Circuit rejected its applicability in litigation against the lead
paint industry.' 27
IV. SANTIAGO V. SHER WIN-WILLIAMS Co.
On September 10, 1993,  four months after the Third Circuit
announced its decision in City of Philadelphia, the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit decided the case of Santiago v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., holding that Massachusetts law did not permit recovery
under the theory of market share liability.' 28 In Santiago, the First
Circuit stated that although it was possible that the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court would adopt some form of market share liabil-
ity, the Supreme Judicial Court would not do so in this particular
120 id.
121 Id. (citing Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241,247 (Mo. 1984); Keith C. Miller & John
D. Hancock, Perspectives on Market Share Liability: Time for a Reassessment?, 88 W. V. L. REV. 81,
102-03 (1985)).
122 City of Phila., 994 F.2d at 126.
128 Id.
124 Id. at 126-27.
125 Id.
126 1d. at 127.
127 See City of Phila., 994 F.2d at 127.
128 3 F.3d 546,551 (lot Cir. 1993).
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case. 12" The Santiago court reasoned that the plaintiffs inability to
identify a specific time when lead paint was applied to the interior of
her house made it likely that manufacturers would be held liable for
a harm that they did not cause.'" Thus, the court reasoned that the
plaintiffs failed to meet even the relaxed identification burden under
market share liability." The Santiago court held that although the
Supreme Judicial Court might adopt a theory of market share liability,
that remedy would not be made available to the current plaintiff. 132
The plaintiff, Monica Santiago ("Santiago"), resided in the same
house in Boston from the time of her birth in 1972 until 1978.' 3'
Santiago alleged that during the time she lived in that house, she
ingested lead paint that had been applied in layers to the inside walls
of her home at various times between 1917, when the house was built,
and 1970. 134
 By the time Santiago was a year old, tests showed that she
had highly elevated levels of lead in her blood. 13" In 1976, the level of
lead in Santiago's blood had reached emergency levels, and she was
hospitalized and underwent chelation therapy to remove the lead from
her body.'" While Santiago's early development appeared to progress
normally, she was diagnosed with a hyperactivity-attention disorder and
motor skill difficulties that medical experts attributed to lead poison-
ing.'"
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant manufacturers in
1987, contending that the defendants, or their predecessors in interest,
produced and marketed virtually all of the lead used in lead paint in
the United States between 1917 and 1970. 138
 Santiago was not able to
identify which, if any, of the defendants produced the lead she in-
gested.'" She was also not able to identify when the paint she ingested




 Id. at 550.
"3 Santiago, 3 F.3d at 547.
34 id.
Iss ld.
"6 1d. Monica Santiago's blood lead level was alleged to have reached as high as 70 ug/dl.
Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant Monica Santiago at 5, Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546
(1st Cir. 1993) (No. 92-2263). According to the Center for Disease Control, a blood lead level
of 69 ug/d1 and above places children at immediate risk of brain injury and death. Id. at 5 n.5.
Chelation therapy is a painful procedure which involves administering a chemical to the child
through injection, intravenous solution or orally, depending on the chemical used. Id. at 6. The
chemical binds with the lead, allowing the body to excrete the lead more rapidly. Id.
I"7
	 3 F.3d at 547,
I 35 Id.
139 ird.
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was applied to the interior of her home."'Although there was no direct
evidence that Santiago actually ate lead paint, there was expert testi-
mony that lead paint was at least a substantial contributing factor to
her poisoning."'
A. The District Court's Decision
In its 1992 opinion, the district court allowed the defendants'
motion for summary judgment that precluded Santiago from proceed-
ing under a theory of market share liability. 142 The court reasoned that
although market share liability had some viability in Massachusetts, the
plaintiff had not shown sufficient causality in this instance to meet even
the relaxed causation burden under the market share theory. 143 In
addition, the court found that market share liability was not applicable
because it would be impossible to determine the amount of contribu-
tion each defendant made to the risk of harm."'
The district court first acknowledged that, under certain circum-
stances, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") would al-
low recovery under a market share theory of liability. 145 The court
noted that the SJC had refused to adopt market share liability in the
1982 DES case Payton v. Abbott Laboratories because the market share
theory proposed by the plaintiffs did not allow defendant manufactur-
ers to present exculpating proof. 146 The court emphasized, however,
that dicta in Payton indicated that use of market share liability might
be allowed by the SJC under appropriate circumstances.' 47 Those cir-
cumstances were present in the 1985 federal district court case McCor-
mack v. Abbott Laboratories. 148 According to the Santiago court, the
district court in McCormack endorsed a market share theory that al-
14o a
141 Id. at 547 & o.3. The First Circuit noted that there was evidence that the plaintiff could
have been exposed to lead in the air, in her food or water, and/or from soil in her neighborhood
that was found to be heavily contaminated with lead. Id. at 547 n.3.
142 Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 195 (D. Mass. 1992), affd, 3 F.3d 546
(1st Cir. 1995).
143 Id. at 192, 193.
144 See id. at 194-95.
145 /d. at 192.
146 1d. at 191 (citing Payton v. Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171, 189 (Mass. 1982)).
147 Santiago, 782 E Supp, at 191. The Payton court stated that it might allow "some relaxation
of the traditional identification requirement in appropriate circumstances so as to allow recovery
against a negligent defendant of that portion of a plaintiff's damages which is represented by
that defendant's contribution of DES to the market in the relevant period of time." 437 N.E.2d
at 190.
' 48 617 F. Stipp, 1521, 1529 (D. Mass. 1985).
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lowed defendants to introduce exculpatory evidence, making each
defendant liable only for that percentage of the market it held during
the relevant time period. 142 The Santiago court thus concluded that
Massachusetts courts would allow recovery under the market share
theory as long as the defendant manufacturers were held liable only
for the amount of plaintiffs' damages proportional to their actual
market share. 15"
In holding that market share liability was not appropriate in San-
tiago's case, the district court first addressed the absence of proof that
her injuries were caused by lead paint.''' The court distinguished
injuries caused by DES by pointing out that exposure to DES results in
a rare form of cancer not attributable to any other cause.' 52 Santiago's
injuries, however, could, according to the court, be attributed to many
causes, such as her parents' child rearing techniques or the educa-
tional and social setting in which she was raised. 1 55 In addition, the
court emphasized that even if Santiago's injuries could be attributed
to lead, it could not be proven that lead-based paint was the source of
her poisoning. 154
 The court noted that Santiago could have been ex-
posed to lead in the air and water in her home and that the soil in her
neighborhood was highly contaminated by lead.'" The district court
found that although it was possible that lead paint caused Santiago's
injuries, a "mere possibility" was not enough for her to proceed under
the theory of market share liability, 156
The district court further reasoned that it would be impossible to
calculate accurately how much each defendant contributed to the risk
of harm to Santiago.'" First, because none of the defendants consis-
tently and actively produced lead pigment throughout the relevant
145 Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 191-92 (citing McCormack, 617 F. Supp. at 1526, 1527). McCor-
mack involved a suit against manufacturers of DES. 617 F. Supp. at 1523 n.l. The McCormack
court based its decision on the SjC's dicta in Payton and declared that 11.5 adoption of market
share liability was consistent with guidelines articulated in that decision. Id. at 1526.
150 Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 192 (citing Payton, 437 N.E.2d at 188).
151 1d.
152 1d.
153 /d. at 192, 193.
114 1d. at 193.
155 Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 193.
156 1d. 'rhe court stated that the public policy reasons favoring the use of market share liability
do not control where there is a possibility that the defendants did not cause the plaintiff's injury.
Id. The court cited two asbestos cases where the court refused to apply market share liability
because the injuries caused by asbestos exposure are not peculiar to asbestos but could also result
from cigarettes and other products. Id. (citing Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp.
183, 191 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Case v. Firebuard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Okla. 1987)).
157 Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 194.
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fifty-four year time span, the court concluded that the data was not
sufficient to accurately calculate the amount of lead pigment produced
by each defendant used in lead-based paint. 158 Second, the court as-
serted that the defendant manufacturers could not be held liable
under a market share theory where they merely supplied lead pigment
to paint manufacturers who then decided what amount of lead to add
to their paint and whether to warn the public of its dangers. 15° For
these two reasons, the district court held that Massachusetts would not
apply market share liability because of the danger that the defendants
would be held liable for more harm than they caused.' 6°
B. The First Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision and held that the plaintiff's market share
theory would stretch the identification requirement beyond what the
SJC would allow.' 6' In reaching its holding, the First Circuit addressed
only the question of whether each defendant's market share could be
accurately determined.' 62 Additionally, the court refused plaintiff's re-
quest to certify to the SJC questions regarding the viability of market
share liability.'"
The First Circuit began its analysis of the plaintiff's market share
claim by emphasizing that the SJC had never explicitly endorsed the
doctrine and had, in Payton, rejected a version of market share liability
in a DES suit.'" Addressing Payton, the First Circuit stated that the SJC
had rejected plaintiffs' market share theory on the grounds that it
158 Id. The court noted that in Payton the SIC indicated that to hold defendants liable each
defendant had to have been actively involved in the DES market throughout all or a substantial
part of the time in which the plaintiffs' mothers ingested DES. Id. (citing Payton, 437 N.E.2d at
188). In addition, the Santiago court stated that courts adjudicating asbestos cases have refused
to apply market share liability because of the difficulty involved in calculating market shares where
plaintiffs were exposed to asbestos over a period of many years, during which time some defen-
dants began or discontinued making asbestos products. 782 F. Supp. at 194 (citing In re Related
Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Stipp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982)).
163 Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 194-95.
166 Id. at 195.
161 Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546,550-51 (1st Cir. 1993).
162 Id. The court accepted for the sake of argument (1) that the SIC would relax the
identification requirements in some circumstances and allow a plaintiff to recover under a market
share theory; (2) that the SJC. would allow market share liability in lead poisoning cases; (3) that
the plaintiff had shown sufficient evidence for a fact finder to determine that her injuries were
caused by lead poisoning; (4) that lead paint was a "substantial contributing factor of her lead
poisoning"; and (5) that the defendants could be found to have acted negligently toward the
plaintiff despite being mere bulk suppliers of lead pigment and not manufacturers or marketers
of lead-based paint. Id. at 550.
163 Id. at 548.






would violate two principles underlying the identification requirement:
(1) that wrongdoers be held liable only for the harm they cause, and
(2) that tortfeasors be separated from innocent actors.' 65 The First
Circuit determined that Santiago's claim failed to satisfy either prin-
ciple.'""
The First Circuit stated that Santiago's inability to determine the
specific time the injury-causing lead paint was applied to the interior
of her house precluded her from satisfying the two principles under-
lying the identification requirement.'"7 Because defendants' produc-
tion of lead pigment varied significantly between 1917 and 1970, any
calculation of defendants' market share inevitably would result in some
defendants' being held liable for a share of the plaintiffs' damages
larger than their market share at the time the injury-causing paint was
applied to the walls of the plaintiff's home.'"8 Additionally, the court
noted that several defendants were not producing lead pigment at all
during significant portions of the fifty-four year period."'' Thus, the
court reasoned that allowing the plaintiff to proceed under a market
share theory could result in some defendants' being held liable for
harm caused by paint applied when they were not in business.'" Finally,
the court noted that the Payton dicta relied on by the plaintiff indicates
that relaxation of the identification requirement would be appropriate
only where the plaintiff is able to identify the relevant period of time
when the defendant manufactured the injury-causing product."'
The First Circuit rejected on equity grounds the plaintiff's request
to certify to the SJC the question of whether Santiago should be
allowed to proceed under a market share theory of liability. 172 Santiago
had originally opposed certification, and the court emphasized that
she had changed her position only after losing at the district court
level. 17" The court stated that, ordinarily, a party that chooses to litigate
its state claim in federal court must accept the federal court's interpre-
tation of state law. 174 Because Santiago chose to bring her claim in
federal court and opposed certification at the district court level, and
165 Santiago, 3 F.3d at 550.
166 Id.
167 Id.
Os Id. at 551.
163 Id.
170 Santiago, 3 F.3d at 551.
en Id .
172 Id. at 548, The court noted that , judge Breyer thought the issue should be certified to the
SJC. Id. at 548 n.4. judge Stahl and Judge Friedman comprised the two-judge majority against
certification. See id.
113 Id. at 548,
174 Id.
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in light of the fact that it had been five years since she initiated her
claim, the court held that it would be unfair to the defendants to allow
the plaintiff to relitigate the core issues of her claim.' 75
The First Circuit concluded that Santiago did not meet even the
relaxed identification requirement under the market share theory of
liability because she did not present evidence showing specifically when
the injury-causing paint was applied to the inside of her home. 176 In
reaching its holding, the Santiago court reasoned that, if market share
liability were imposed, some defendants would likely be held liable for
harm they did not cause.'' This was due to the fact that defendants'
production of lead pigment varied significantly throughout the rele-
vant time period and thus no single, accurate market share could be
determined for the whole time period.' 78
V. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF CAUSATION: TOWARD A UNIFIED
THEORY OF MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
In refusing to relax the causation requirement and adopt the
theory of market share liability, the First and Third Circuits firmly
embraced one side of the theoretical debate over the role of causation
in tort law. Those courts that have adopted market share liability
generally see causation as a tool to be used to achieve certain policy
goals. 179 Courts rejecting market share liability, however, treat causation
as an end in itself. 18°
The belief that causation should be viewed as an end in itself is
espoused by those claiming to subscribe to a corrective justice view of
tort law. 18 ' Their reliance on corrective justice, however, is unsound.
Pure corrective justice does not treat causation as an inflexible com-
mand. Rather, corrective justice allows for some manipulation of cau-
sation when doing so serves the interests of justice. Use of some form
of market share liability is necessary to achieve justice in the context
of lead paint litigation. A conservative form of market share liability,
one adapted from the principles announced by the First Circuit in
Santiago, would satisfy both the utilitarian and corrective justice views
of causation and should be adopted.




179 See cases cited infra note 192.
18n See cases cited infra note 191.
191 See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text for an introduction to the corrective
justice view.
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A. The Circuit Court Decisions and the Problem of Causation
A clear message in the recent circuit court decisions is that actions
seeking acceptance of market share liability are best brought in state
courts. This message was most clearly delivered in City of Philadelphia,
where both the district court and the Third Circuit focused exclusively
on the principle that federal courts should not expand state tort law
without clear guidance from the state courts.'" The Third Circuit's
lengthy explanation for its refusal to allow plaintiffs to proceed under
a market share theory of liability emphasized that any relaxation of the
causation requirement would be a controversial and radical step.'" The
Third Circuit's opinion does not indicate that the court is biased
against the adoption of market share liability. 184 In fact, the court's
even-handed review of policy arguments both for and against adoption
of the theory indicates it would welcome whatever choice the Pennsyl-
vania and other state supreme courts make.' 85
In Santiago, the First Circuit's refusal to allow the plaintiff's market
share liability claim was also a result of the court's reluctance to expand
state tort law without clear approval from the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. 186 The First Circuit's opinion in Santiago differed from
that of the Third Circuit in City of Philadelphia, however, in that the
First Circuit presented a much more detailed analysis of market share
liability.'" The First Circuit's opinion provides insight into what trou-
bles most courts about market share liability, and what version, if any,
they would find most acceptable. It is significant that the 'First Cir-
cuit ignored most of the issues addressed by the district court and
chose to focus exclusively on the issue of causation.' 88 In doing so the
First Circuit recognized that the significance of these secondary issues
would vary from case to case, while the issue of causation is the primary
182 See supra notes 99-127 and accompanying text for a discussion of these decisions.
183 See supra notes 106,126-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Third Circuit's
view of market share liability. The Third Circuit's opinion stands in stark contrast with the district
court decision where market share liability was dismissed in a mere two paragraphs as being
contrary to Pennsylvania state law. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the district court's opinion.
""See supra notes 103-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Third Circuit's
opinion.
18-''See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Third Circuit's
review of policy arguments.
114e See Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546,551 (1st Cir. 1993).
187 See supra notes 161-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the First Circuit's
analysis.
188
 See Santiago, 3 F.3d at 550-51.
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factor at the heart of every dispute over whether to adopt market share
liability.
All versions of market share liability call for a significant relaxation
of the identification requirement. It is this departure from traditional
principles of causation that makes courts reluctant to adopt the the-
ory.' 9" Although it did not allow use of market share liability in Santiago,
the First Circuit indicated that it would allow for some relaxation of
the identification requirement as long as no defendant would be liable
for more than its market share's worth of damages and there was no
chance that any defendant not in the market at all would be liable for
any damages)" Thus, the First Circuit seems willing to allow a limited
version of market share liability that would not overly weaken the
causal link between tortfeasor and victim.
B. Competing Visions of the Role of Causation in Tort Law
Causation has played an ambiguous and uncertain role in tort law.
Some courts have adhered strictly to the rule of causation, treating it
as a principle of the highest order.'"' Other courts, however, have been
quick to relax causation requirements when doing so helps further
certain policy goals underlying tort law. 192 This rift between the courts
reflects an ongoing theoretical debate over the proper role of causa-
tion—whether it should be viewed as an end in itself or as a functional
means for achieving societal goals.'"
Guido Calabresi provides the foremost treatment of causation as
a functional means for achieving policy goals.'" The object of law,
according to Calabresi, is to serve human needs, and thus legal require-
ments, including causal requirements, must serve this end.' 95 Rather
than representing a comprehensive legal principle, causation functions
as a means through which differing policy goals are combined and
1 " See, e.g., City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1993); Mulcahy v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo.
1984) (en bane).
19° See Santiago, 3 F.3d at 550.
191 See Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 337, 345 (111. 1990); Mulcahy, 386 N.W.2d at
76; Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 246-47.
192 See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
flytnowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989); Martin
v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368, 381 (Wash. 1984) (en bane).
"° See generally Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, ft, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 69 (1975); Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63
CHI.-KENT L. Rev. 407 (1987).
194 See generally Calabresi, supra note 193,
195 1d, at 105.
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achieved. Thus, causal concepts should be used flexibly to achieve the
deterrence, cost spreading and distributional goals of tort law. 196
 Cala-
bresi warns that if causal concepts are too rigidly defined and applied,
they will no longer adequately serve recognized social goals and would
not allow the introduction of goals that cannot be openly acknow-
ledged or new goals that have yet to be articulated."'
Ernest Weinrib has provided the best known treatment of causa-
tion under the theory of corrective justice. 108
 Weinrib maintains that
causation, together with wrongdoing, provides the necessary link be-
tween the wrongdoer and the victim.' 99
 Causation explains why this
plaintiff is entitled to compensation, and wrongdoing on the part of
the defendant explains why this defendant is obligated to compensate."°
When a defendant's wrongdoing inflicts a loss on the plaintiff, the
transference of compensation from the defendant to the plaintiff acts
to annul the effects of the wrong." 01
 This, according to Weinrib, pro-
vides the concept of causation with its own inherent moral value. 202
Calabresi's instrumentalist approach to causation favors applica-
tion of market share liability in lead paint litigation. The tort law goals
of deterrence, cost spreading and wealth distribution are all served by
placing the costs to lead paint poisoning victims on those who manu-
factured the dangerous lead pigment and acted to prevent the public
from learning of its harmful effects. 203
 The instrumentalist view of
causation would therefore call for a relaxing of the causation principle
to achieve these goals.
It seems equally clear that Weinrib's normative view of causation
would leave lead paint poisoning victims without a remedy against lead
pigment manufacturers unless they could identify the specific pro-
ducer of the paint that harmed them. A close examination of the
theoretical roots of the normative view of causation, however, casts
some doubt on this conclusion. Weinrib claims that his exposition
of corrective justice is consistent with the philosophy of Immanuel
196 See id. at 73, 107.
197 See id. at 107.
198
 See generally Weinrib, supra note 193.
1" Id. at 409.
200 Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA.
L. REv. 997, 1010 (1990); Weinrib, supra note 193, at 430.
201 See Weinrib, supra note 193, at 430.
2021d.
200 1The threat of over-deterrence is not present in the context of lead paint because lead is
no longer an ingredient in paint and, therefore, there is no danger that manufacturers would
stop producing a beneficial product due to the threat of litigation. See Fischer, supra note 9, at
1652 for a similar argument regarding DES.
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Kant204 and is derived directly from Aristotle's theory of corrective
justice. 205 According to Professor Richard Wright, however, Weinrib's
interpretation of the principle of corrective justice and the role of
causation within it is not consistent with that of Aristotle. 206 If one
accepts Wright's interpretation of Aristotle, and the theory of correc-
tive justice that results from that interpretation, market share liability
is a viable theory.
According to Aristotle, there are two broad categories of justice:
general justice and particular justice. 207 General justice refers to justice
in the sense of obeying the law, while particular justice is justice in the
sense of maintaining equality or fairness. 208 Particular justice dictates
that everyone is entitled to a certain share of goods according to
merit. 209 Particular justice is further divided by Aristotle into distribu-
tive justice and corrective justice. 21° Distributive justice provides the
terms according to which goods ought to be divided among members
of society.211 Corrective justice applies when this distribution is dis-
turbed.212 When one acquires more than one's rightful share as a result
of causing injury to another person, it is the role of the judge under
the principle of corrective justice to restore equality. 213 Justice is equal-
2114 Weinrib, supra note 193, at 449 (citing IMMANUEI, KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
OE JUSTICE 34 U. Ladd trans., 1965)). Weinrib's claim of symmetry between his view of corrective
justice and the views of Kant is challenged by Richard W. Wright in his article Substantive Corrective
Justice, 77 IOWA L. Rev. 625, 644-64 (1992).
205 Weinrib, supra note 193, at'449 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V.2-4); see also
Ernest." Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IowA L. Rev. 403, 403-04 (1992). Aristotle is considered
the inventor of the corrective justice theory and his treatment is still held to be the "classic
analysis." Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 101
LEGAL STUD. 187, 188 (1981) (citing George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARV. L. REV. 537, 538 (1972)); see Wright, supra note 204, at 629 (Aristotle's treatment of
corrective justice still considered to be one of the best).
2°6 Wright, supra note 204, at 629-30.
207 Kathryn R. Heidt, Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Second Order Liability: Who Should Pay
When the Culpable Cannot?, 47 WASH. Sc LEE L. REV. 347, 350 (1990) (citing ARISTO'T'LE, NI-
COMACHEAN ETHICS V.2 at 1130b1-4, 1130b17-18 (D. Ross trans., 1963, 1980)),
2()S W.F.R. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE'S ETHICAL THEORY 185 (2d ed. 1980).
209 Id. at 189. Aristotle includes "honour or money or safety" among the goods that are
distributed among citizens. 2 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE V.2 at 1130h2 U. Barnes ed. & W.D. Ross &J.0. Urmson trans., 1984) [hereinafter
ARISTOTLE, Ethics].
210 See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 207, at 351 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V.2 at
1130b30-1131a1 (D. Ross trans., 1963, 1980)).
211 See id. Justice in the distribution of goods is described by Ariskttle according to a geomet-
rical formula. liAttutE, supra note 208, at 189 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V.3 at
1131b12-13).
212 See Heidt, supra note 207, at 352-53.
2" See HARDIE, supra note 208, at 19'2; Heidt, supra note 207, at 352-53.
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ity; therefore, the judge has two responsibilities. To achieve the just
result, the judge must take the unjust gain from the wrongdoer in
addition to rectifying the unjust loss of the victim.214 Thus, assuming
that manufacturers of lead pigment acted negligently, corrective justice
will be achieved only when both the manufacturers are forced to pay
damages consistent with what they gained from producing lead pig-
ment and the victims of lead poisoning are compensated for their
injuries.
Weinrib's assertion that law, particularly causation, stands on its
own, separate from ethics and politics, is not consistent with Aristotle's
view of corrective justice.218 According to Wright, Aristotle viewed law
as an instrument that should be used to achieve justice. 218 Aristotle was
a principlist. 217
 He believed there are fundamental principles of moral-
ity and justice and that law should be applied in such a way as to give
effect to those principles. 218 The written law will always be incom-
plete:1 ' 9 Aristotle argued that one should turn to the underlying prin-
ciples of justice and, through wise application, fill in the details or gaps
in law in order to achieve the just result. 22° Thus, a pure corrective
justice approach would call for the law of causation to be relaxed in
lead paint litigation and allow for some form of recovery against lead
paint manufacturers.
C. Toward a Unified Theory of Market Share Liability
Both the instrumentalist and corrective justice theories underlying
causation call for relaxation of the identification principle to allow for
the compensation of lead paint poisoning victims. The instrumentalist
theory is the broader of the two in that it imposes no limits on how
far market share liability can be expanded to achieve social goals.
Therefore, to be acceptable under both theories, a market share theory
of liability will have to fit within the narrower confines of corrective
justice.
214 See Wright, supra note 204, at 699.
215
 Id, at 686.
211' See id. (citing 2 AinsToTi,E, Magna Moralia, in THE COMPLETE WORKS or AtusToTLE 1.33
at 1195a1-7, 1 194b27-29 (J. Barnes ed. & St. G. Stock trans., 1984); ARISTOTLE, Ethics., supra note
209, al V.6 at 1134a24-1134b1, V.7 at 1790-91, V.I0; 2 ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric, in THE Comm.rrk
WORKS AnisTcrlik 1.10 at 1368b8-9, 1.13 at 1373b1-9, 1374a25-b23 (J. Barnes ed, & W. Rhys
Roberts trans„ 1984).
217 id.
215 hi. at 686-87.
919 Wright, supra note 204, at 686.
210
 Id. at 686-87.
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The guiding principles of corrective justice are that defendants
should forfeit that which they gained through wrongful conduct, and
plaintiffs should be compensated for what they lost. 221 To give effect to
these principles, a market share theory of liability should be based on
two requirements adapted from those endorsed by the First Circuit in
Santiago. 222 The Santiago court's first requirement, that wrongdoers
should only be held liable for harm they caused, is derived from the
principle that causation is, in itself, a moral imperative. Under a pure
Aristotelian theory of corrective justice, however, the moral imperative
becomes the elimination of unjust gains and losses. Therefore, the first
requirement for a theory of market share liability becomes that wrong-
doers should be held liable only for what they gained from their
wrongful conduct. The Santiago court's second requirement, that tort-
feasors should be separated from innocent actors, is consistent with
the principles of corrective justice and should remain unchanged.
Corrective justice calls for taking only what a wrongdoer gained
from its wrongful conduct. Therefore, defendants in market share
actions should be liable only for damages proportional to their true
market share. This means all the defendants must have been engaged
in the negligent activity throughout the relevant time span and their
market shares must have remained relatively constant. Thus, there is a
burden on the plaintiffs to identify a short span of relevant time. When
it is not possible to establish a narrow time frame, plaintiffs' best
chance for success is to bring a class action. Where a plaintiff class is
made up of hundreds or thousands of individuals injured in different
places and at different times, fluctuations in defendants' market shares
become less significant. 223
Additionally, as in the case of Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, each
defendant should be able to present exculpatory evidence regarding
its share of the market or whether it produced the harmful product at
al1.224 If the resulting market shares total less than 100% of plaintiffs'
damages, the plaintiff should bear the cost of the difference. 225 This
may appear to conflict with the principle that victims should be made
221 See id. at 698-99.
222 See supra text accompanying note 165 for a discussion of the restrictions on market share
liability suggested by the First Circuit.
225 See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740,823 (E.D.N.Y. 1989),
aff'd, 818 F.2r1 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (total damage done to community can be assessed accurately
and consistently where all possible claimants and all possible defendants are joined together in
a single suit); Brief of Plaintiff-Cross-Appellee and Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Philadelphia
Housing Authority at 30-31, City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993) (Nos.
92-1463, 92-1419).
"4 See Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368,382-83 (Wash. 1984) (en bane).
225 AS in Martin, it does not matter how many producers are sued, as long as those named
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whole. It should be assumed, however, that if each defendant's market
share has been accurately calculated, the plaintiffs failed to identify all
those who unjustly gained at their expense. Wrongdoers must be made
to forfeit only what they gained through their own negligent conduct—
they cannot be made to pay for what others gained through their
wrongful conduct.
Finally, market share liability should be based on a national mar-
ket. Corrective justice is concerned only with whether there was wrong-
ful conduct and whether there were unjust gains and losses as a result
of that conduct. Once it is established that a defendant acted negli-
gently, the only question is how much it gained through its negligent
conduct. Therefore, as with the market share theory adopted by the
court in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., a defendant cannot excuse itself
from liability by showing it does not market its product in the plaintiff's
geographic area. 226 In addition, because what matters is wrongful con-
duct, a defendant cannot excuse itself from liability by showing it did
not produce the specific item used by the plaintiff.227 As the Hymowitz
court noted, it would not be just for a defendant to escape liability
simply because it negligently marketed a more identifiable version of
the product or sold only to certain stores.22s
The plaintiff in Santiago would not have succeeded in her claim
under the unified theory of market share liability described above.
Pure corrective justice does call for a relaxation of the causation re-
quirement in order to achieve a just result. To allow recovery against
the defendants who controlled widely varying percentages of the lead
pigment market over fifty-four years, however, would violate the prin-
ciple of taking only what a wrongdoer gained as a result of its negli-
gence. Where it is not possible to accurately calculate a defendant's
market share, that defendant cannot be held liable under the unified
theory of market share liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The unified theory of market share liability provides an option for
those courts hesitant to expand the bounds of tort law, yet determined
to reach a just result. By holding lead pigment manufacturers liable
as defendants are only held responsible for damages in proportion to their true market share.
689 P.2d at 382.
225 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
221 See id.
228 See id. For example, a defendant could excuse itself from liability by showing it did not
produce DES for pregnancy use; it could not, however, excuse itself from liability by showing it
produced green DES pills when the plaintiff ingested red DES pills. See id.
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only for what they gained from their wrongful conduct at the time the
plaintiff suffered his or her loss, a limit is placed on what would
otherwise be an excessively far-reaching theory of liability. This limit is
consistent with the principles of corrective justice. More important,
however, it allows those who will suffer from the effects of lead paint
poisoning for the rest of their lives a means for obtaining justice.
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